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Hybrid threshold adaptable 
quantum secret sharing scheme 
with reverse Huffman-Fibonacci-
tree coding
Hong Lai1, Jun Zhang2, Ming-Xing Luo3, Lei Pan2, Josef Pieprzyk4,5, Fuyuan Xiao1 & 
Mehmet A. Orgun6,7
With prevalent attacks in communication, sharing a secret between communicating parties is an 
ongoing challenge. Moreover, it is important to integrate quantum solutions with classical secret 
sharing schemes with low computational cost for the real world use. This paper proposes a novel hybrid 
threshold adaptable quantum secret sharing scheme, using an m-bonacci orbital angular momentum 
(OAM) pump, Lagrange interpolation polynomials, and reverse Huffman-Fibonacci-tree coding. To 
be exact, we employ entangled states prepared by m-bonacci sequences to detect eavesdropping. 
Meanwhile, we encode m-bonacci sequences in Lagrange interpolation polynomials to generate the 
shares of a secret with reverse Huffman-Fibonacci-tree coding. The advantages of the proposed scheme 
is that it can detect eavesdropping without joint quantum operations, and permits secret sharing for an 
arbitrary but no less than threshold-value number of classical participants with much lower bandwidth. 
Also, in comparison with existing quantum secret sharing schemes, it still works when there are 
dynamic changes, such as the unavailability of some quantum channel, the arrival of new participants 
and the departure of participants. Finally, we provide security analysis of the new hybrid quantum 
secret sharing scheme and discuss its useful features for modern applications.
Secret sharing is an important and powerful tool for protecting confidentiality and integrity of sensitive informa-
tion, such as missile launch codes, bank account information, medical information and encryption keys. Secret 
sharing can be categorized into two broad classes: classical and quantum. Secret sharing was invented in its classi-
cal form simultaneously by Shamir1 and Blakley2. The Shamir secret sharing splits a secret into multiple shares in 
such a way that a large enough collection of shares can be used to reconstruct the secret. The minimum number 
of shares that enables the reconstruction is called the threshold or in general the access structure. However, if 
the number of shares is smaller than the threshold, then they provide no information about the secret. In other 
words, when a fewer than the threshold number of shares are compromised, the secret cannot be revealed. Later 
many other secret sharing schemes3–7 have been proposed to improve the traditional ones. The obvious weakness 
of classical secret sharing is that an adversary can duplicate shares without being detected. As a result, eavesdrop-
ping attacks could happen in the reconstruction phase when the participants send their shares to a combiner who 
computes the secret.
To address the eavesdropping problem, Hillery et al.8 extended classical secret sharing (CSS) to a (m, n)-threshold 
quantum secret sharing (QSS), which is the generation of quantum key distribution (QKD)9–11. In their scheme, 
GHZ states are used to transmit the shares securely in the presence of eavesdroppers, like the method used in 
ref. 12. The security of their scheme is guaranteed by the quantum no-cloning theorem13. Following Hillery 
et al.’s work, many quantum secret sharing schemes14–27 have been proposed with rigorous security proofs as well 
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as properties that make them suitable for many applications. Though quantum secret sharing can detect eaves-
dropping, Źukowski et al.23 argue that QSS is different from CSS. The main difference is that in QSS, the choice 
of parameters m and n is restricted while in CSS, the parameters can be arbitrarily selected as long as n ≥ m. 
In particular, in a (m, n)-threshold QSS, the parameters m, n must satisfy the condition, 2m − 1 > n, which is 
imposed by the quantum no-cloning theorem13. However, in practice, security policies and the adversary struc-
ture demand the parameters m and n to be flexible and scalable. Therefore, it is very challenging to develop a new 
(m, n)-threshold QSS scheme, whose parameters m and n are not restricted.
In this paper, we propose a hybrid quantum secret sharing scheme to address this challenge. The new scheme 
is free from any restrictions on the parameters m and n and therefore it is suitable for many real-world applica-
tions. We employ entangled states prepared by m-bonacci sequences to detect eavesdropping, which can be done 
by any subset of participants that contains at least 



m
2
 (ceiling = ⌈ ⌉x x( )  is the smallest integer greater than or 
equal to x) members. That is to say, not all participants are required to reach a consensus in order to reveal eaves-
dropping. We use m-bonacci sequences encoded in Lagrange interpolation polynomials to generate the secret, 
with no restrictions imposed on the parameters m, n. Given that m-bonacci numbers can be represented by 
Fibonacci numbers, we use the structure of the Huffman-Fibonacci tree with the greedy algorithm to encode 
m-bonacci sequences, i.e., the higher the frequency at which a Fibonacci number appears in m-bonacci sequences, 
the longer the block of binary codes. Therefore, our scheme can greatly improve the coding capacity, thus reduc-
ing the use of entangled photons, which are expensive and difficult to prepare. In real-world applications, some 
changes may occur when a new participant joins or alternatively, an existing participant leaves or there is a sud-
den disruption of some quantum channels. The new scheme has the capability to deal with such changes since the 
m-bonacci-number coding can be easily modified to reflect changes in secret sharing.
Results
In this section, we first describe a new hybrid quantum secret sharing based on m-bonacci sequences, as shown in 
Fig. 1. The scheme consists of two components: quantum and classical. The classical component allows to estab-
lish an infinite random sequence in a way of quantum encoding, which is shared by classical participants. The 
classical shares of the random sequence allow any m + 1 participants to recover the sequence. The one-time-pad 
encryption is done by a collection of m + 1 classical participants. The decryption can be done by any other collec-
tion of m + 1 classical participants. There are three phases in the proposed scheme:
•	 share generation and distribution – the dealer phase
•	 eavesdropping detection phase
•	 secret reconstruction phase
Then its security is analyzed and compared with other related QKD protocols.
Figure 1. The sketch for the hybrid threshold adaptable QSS scheme which consists of three parts. 
= + + +− − −F F F Fn
m
n
m
n
m
n m
m
1 2  represents m-bonacci sequences, B1, B2, ···, Bm denote m quantum shares, and 
C1, C2, ···, Cn denote n classical shares, Pe denotes the error rate and t the preset threshold value for Pe.
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New hybrid threshold quantum secret sharing scheme. First, we introduce the generalized Fibonacci 
sequence28, that is so-called m-bonacci sequence which is used in our later scheme. The m-bonacci sequence of 
order m ≥ 2 denoted by Fn
m ( ∈ +n ) is defined by the following recurrence28,29:
= + + +− − −F F F F ; (1)n
m
n
m
n
m
n m
m
1 2
with the first m − 2 initial terms set to 0 and the (m − 1)th initial term set to 1. In particular, the 2-bonacci 
sequence is the usual Fibonacci sequence30; 3-bonacci sequence is usually called the Tribonacci sequence28. In 
Table 1, we list the first ten m-bonacci numbers when m = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
Then, we present the entities used in our secret sharing, which are as follows:
•	 a dealer,
•	 m (which is the same as m in m-bonacci numbers) participants who hold quantum shares (quantum 
participants),
•	  participants who hold classical shares (classical participants) and
•	 Adversaries.
Dealer is a party who is trusted by all quantum and classical participants. It is responsible for the initialization 
of the secret sharing. It generates shares and distributes them to all the participants. It is assumed that after finish-
ing its tasks, the dealer “forgets” all the parameters of the scheme together with the secret.
Quantum participants hold their quantum shares. Each quantum participant owns one quantum share. Their 
task is to detect eavesdropping. This guarantees unconditional security of the scheme.
Classical participants hold their classical shares. There are  classical participants. They are responsible for 
secret reconstruction. Each classical participant receives their share from the dealer via a classical secure channel. 
Unlike in CSS, in our hybrid QSS, any q (q ≥ m + 1) classical participants can recover the key (secret) using their 
classical shares (after eavesdropping detection).
Adversaries includes the outsider and at most m insiders. The former has no valid share, while the latter is 
actually a legal participant with a valid share.
Finally, the proposed hybrid ′ + t m m(( , ), ( 1, )) threshold QSS is defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Hybrid ′ + t m m 1(( , ), ( , )) threshold QSS). There are m (where > > ′ m t ) quantum 
participants and  classical participants. The secret can be recovered by m + 1 classical participants and t′ quan-
tum participants. t′ quantum shares from t′ quantum participants can be used for eavesdropping detection while 
m + 1 classical shares owned by m + 1 classical participants can be used to recover the secret.
The steps of our scheme are described in details as follows:
Dealer phase. (1) Dealer first prepares entangled states using the m-bonacci number source as shown in 
Fig. 2. To be exact, the entangled states are prepared by the recurrence relation = ∑ = −F Fn
m
i
m
n i
m
1  on the Vogel 
spiral (refer to Simon et al.’s work31,32). After entering the spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC), the 
entangled states are broken into m entangled photons with smaller m-bonacci values. Each red circle dot repre-
sents an orbital angular momentum (OAM) shifter that takes the OAM in that branch to zero. Each place where 
lines split or cross is implied to have a beam splitter. The portion shown has OAM values from −Fn
m
1 to −Fn m
m  com-
ing out of the OAM sorter.
An OAM-entangled outgoing state depends on m, which is as follows:
∑ + + +− − − − − − − − − +   

F F F F F F F F F( )
(2)m
n
m
n
m
n m
m
n
m
n
m
n
m
n m
m
n
m
n m
m
B B B1 2 2 3 1 1 1 m1 2
where the index m runs through the allowed m-bonacci numbers in the pump beam: ∑ Fn
m . Each of the m quan-
tum participants receives one entangled photon from the entangled states. In the lab of each quantum participant, 
there are two types of detection sorters (i.e., the Ei sorter and the Fi sorter, i ∈ {1, 2, ···, m}), directing the entangled 
photon to one of them at random. The Ei sorter is made up of an OAM sorter33 followed by a set of single-photon 
detectors. The OAM sorter transmits OAM eigenstates of various pump values into various outgoing directions, 
allowing them to be registered and determined in different detectors. The Fi sorter is used to distinguish different 
superpositions of the form. The states obtained in the Ei- and Fi- type measurements are nonorthogonal to each 
other. Therefore, the security of our proposed scheme is based on the fact that nonorthogonal states are indistin-
guishable34, and this principle is similar to the one used in the BB849 and Ekert10 protocols. However, the equa-
tion (2) has an unusual feature, that is, the states detected in the Ei-type measurement form a mutually orthogonal 
set among themselves, while those in the Fi-type measurements are not all orthogonal to each other but form a 
Fn
m n = 1 n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5 n = 6 n = 7 n = 8 n = 9 n = 10
m = 2 1 2 3 5 8 13 21 34 55 89
m = 3 1 2 4 7 13 24 44 81 149 274
m = 4 1 2 4 8 15 29 56 108 208 401
m = 5 1 2 4 8 16 31 61 120 236 464
m = 6 1 2 4 8 16 32 63 125 248 492
Table 1.  Fibonacci numbers of order m = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
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chain, where each state is nonorthogonal to the two adjacent states in the chain. Moreover, for orbital angular 
momentum, it is not necessary for quantum states that are orthogonal in Hilbert space to associate to orthogonal 
vectors in the physical space. Likewise, it is not necessary for quantum states that are nonorthogonal in Hilbert 
space to associate to nonorthogonal vectors in the physical space. That is the second fact for our scheme’s 
security.
(2) The beam splitter in the quantum participant’s laboratory, sends the entangled photon to either the sorter 
Ei or the sorter Fi at random, where i ∈ {1, 2, ···, m}. Quantum participants B1, B2, ···, Bm record the sorter to which 
the photon goes and the detected OAM value.
(3) Dealer allocates = ∑ = −F Fn
m
i
m
n i
m
1  to classical participants  C C C, , ,1 2  in the following way. Note that if 
there is something wrong with quantum channel transmission or the composition of classical participants 
changes (i.e., a new participant wants to join or an existing participant wishes to leave), then the dealer chooses 
adaptable m-bonacci numbers to produce new secret shares in terms of the mentioned flow of participants. This 
is a novel feature of our threshold adaptable secret sharing scheme.
Next the dealer uses the following algorithm to encode the secret:
Algorithm
(1) Choose a prime p, > − p Fmax( , )n
m
1 .
(2) R a n d o m l y  a n d  u n i f o r m l y  g e n e r at e  a  nu m b e r  ∈a p0  a n d  c r e a t e  a  p o l y n o m i a l : 
= + + + +− −
−
−f x F x F x F x a p( ) modn
m m
n
m m
n m
m
1 2
1
0 , where ∈ ∈a F a,i n
m
p0 .
(3) Sample f (x) at  points such that A1 = f(1), A2 = f (2), … , = 

A f ( ). The final  shares are (i′ , Ai′), for 
≤ ′ ≤ i1 .
Finally, the dealer communicates  shares (i′ , Ai′) to appropriate classical participants, where ≤ ′ ≤ i1 .
Eavesdropping detection phase. During the process of secret share distribution, when there is a mis-
match in the entangled state photons, and if the error rate Pe is larger than the preset threshold t between Dealer 
and participants, they abort this communication and return to the Dealer’s phase. Otherwise, the communication 
continues to obtain a secure key for encrypting the shared secret, until the dealer sends an error notification or 
stops sending secret shares. The details are given below.
(1) Any m +  1 classical participants use their shares ∪ ′ ′i A{( , )}i  to reconstruct the polynomial 
= + + + +− −
−
−f x F x F x F x a p( ) modn
m m
n
m m
n m
m
1 2
1
0 . Then they can obtain the coefficients of the pol-
ynomial, i.e., −Fn m
m , ···, −Fn
m
1. Fn
m can be computed as = ∑ = −F Fn
m
i
m
n i
m
1 .
(2) Any 



m
2
 (when m > 2) of B1, B2, ···, Bm quantum participants can detect eavesdropping, by comparing the 
detected values with the values recovered by the m + 1 classical participants. We take m = 2 for example to 
Figure 2. Setup for entangled states with m-bonacci-valued OAM on the Vogel spiral adapted from that of 
Simon et al.31,32. After entering SPDC, the entangled states are broken into m entangled photons. Each red circle 
dot represents an OAM shifter that takes the OAM in that branch to zero. Each place where lines split or cross is 
implied to have a BS. The portion shown has OAM values from −Fn
m
1 to −Fn m
m  coming out of the OAM sorter. A 
pair of detectors Ei and Fi (i ∈ {1, 2, ···, m}) are used at the output ports of the final nonpolarizing BSs. The Ei 
sorter is used for allowing photons to arrive at the arrays of single-photon detectors when they are m-bonacci 
values, and the Fi sorter is used for allowing “diagonal” superposition and filtering out any non-m-bonacci 
values.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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illustrate how eavesdropping is detected. Suppose that an adversary Eve is eavesdropping on the quantum 
channel between B1, B2. Clearly, she does not know which type of a detection measurement (the sorter Ei or 
the sorter Fi) took place in Bi’s laboratory (1 ≤ i ≤ m). So, Eve has to guess. If the entangled photon goes to the 
Ei sorter in Eve’s laboratory when going to the Fi sorter in Bi’s laboratory, or the entangled photon goes to the 
Fi sorter in Eve’s laboratory when going to the Ei sorter in Bi’s laboratory, then the Bi measurement is going to 
be erroneous with the probability of 1
2
. Eve’s activity is going to be detected by B1, B2, ···, Bm when they com-
pare their scheme transcripts. More precisely, we have the following two cases to consider:
(1)  Eve makes an Ei-type measurement on a photon, which is actually in the eigenstate Fi
m . Then she will 
detect one of the two +−F Fi
m
i
m
2  or + +F Fi
m
i
m
2 , with the probability of 12 , respectively. She can send a copy of it to Bi. If Bi receives one of these superpositions and makes an Fi-type measurement, she 
will read out one of the values −Fi
m
2, Fi
m, or +Fi
m
2, with the respective probabilities of 14 , 
1
2
, 1
4
 (see (a) and 
(b) in Fig. 3). However, she should obtain Fi
m  with the probability of 1 if there is no eavesdropper.
(2)  Eve makes an Fi-type measurement on a photon, which is actually in the superposition state 
+−F Fi
m
i
m
2 . She will detect one of the two eigenstates −Fi
m
2, Fi
m, with the probability of 1
2
, respectively. 
Eve may send a copy of it to Bi. If Bi receives one of these eigenstates and makes an Ei-type measure-
ment, she will obtain one of the superpositions +−F Fi
m
i
m
2  or + +F Fi
m
i
m
2  or ++ +F Fi
m
i
m
2 4 , with 
the respective probabilities of 1
4
, 1
2
, 1
4
 (see (a) and (b) in Fig. 4). However, she should only obtain 
+−F Fi
m
i
m
2  with the guaranteed probability of 1 if there is no eavesdropper.
In both cases, if Eve eavesdrops with a fraction η (fraction of times Eve interferes) of the trials, the fraction of 
times Eve guesses wrong basis is 1
2
, and the fraction of times wrong basis leads to error is 1
2
. So, when quantum 
participant B1 compares her results with B2’s, they will find that their outcomes are inconsistent a fraction f of the 
time, which is
η
η
= × ×
=
f 1
2
1
2
4
Note that in our scheme, each entangled photon binds the classical share together. Moreover, not all quantum par-
ticipants are needed to detect eavesdropping when m > 2. This is because we can apply the recovered m-bonacci 
numbers with classical shares, to verify its consistency with the m-bonacci numbers carried by entangled states. 
Furthermore, with the detected values from the entangled photons, we can assess the security of the quantum 
channel (whether it is free from the adversarial activity or not).
Figure 3. When m = 2, the outcome probabilities for eigenstates, where P denotes the probability. (a) When 
the entangled photons goes to the Ei sorter in Bi’s laboratory, and Eve also happens to choose the Ei sorter, an 
incoming eigenstate should be unchanged. (b) When Eve chooses the Fi sorter, each eigenstates can turn in two 
different superposition detections. If one of these superpositions is transmitted to Bi, the net outcomes are now 
three eigenstates that he could detect.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
6Scientific RepoRts | 6:31350 | DOI: 10.1038/srep31350
Secret reconstruction phase. If the participants detect eavesdropping and the error rate is higher than the 
preset threshold value t, they abort the communication and postpone the secret reconstruction phase. Otherwise, 
any m + 1 classical participants can use their classical shares to recover values −Fn m
m , ···, −Fn
m
1, Furthermore, Fn
m can 
be obtained for encoding each sub-key, which constitutes the key for encrypting the secret. With the key, the 
m + 1 classical participants can recover and further share the secret.
In this scheme, we use quantum coding to generate the key for encrypting messages. Moreover, various 
m-bonacci sequences can be used to encode the final key. That is, m is changeable for the key, which can address 
the problems of restricted quantum sources in certain settings and the membership change of participants, such 
as the joining of a new participant or departure of existing participants. Therefore, our scheme is more practical 
compared the other quantum secret sharing schemes.
Security Analysis
First, using the technique of Simon et al.31,32,35, we show that our scheme is secure against insider and outsider 
attacks (Theorems 1 and 2). Later, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme and show that it is immune 
against a number of attacks including cloning, impersonation, replay and man-in-the-middle attacks.
Theorem 1 (Insiders attacks). Given the hybrid ′ + t m m(( , ), ( 1, )) threshold QSS, and the set of classical 
shares available for any k <  m +  1 insiders (classical participants) is = = | ∈s s f i k K{ ( ) }K k i d1d i1 1 , 
⊆ … = < +K n K d m( {1, 2, , }, 1)d d , then scheme is asymptotically perfect with respect to the set of proba-
bility distributions P(⋅ ) on the secret space S. That is, for any  > 0, there exists an integer p0 such that for any 
p > p0 with =S p, we have
ε∆ = − | ≤s s H s H s s( ; ) ( ) ( ) (3)K Kd d
where H(s) is the entropy of s, the conditional entropy |H s s( )Kd  denotes the entropy of s conditioned on sKd, and 
∆ s s( ; )Kd  denotes the entropy loss of s generated by the knowledge of sKd.
Proof. It is worth noting that our proposed hybrid ′ + t m m(( , ), ( 1, )) threshold QSS uses the polynomial 
= + + + +− −
−
−f x F x F x F x a p( ) modn
m m
n
m m
n m
m
1 2
1
0 , where ∈ = − … − ∈a F for i n m n a F, , , 1,i n
m
p0 . 
The sub-secret = + + +− − −s F F F
i
n
m
n
m
n m
m
1 2
1 . Assume that there are d (d = |Kd| < m + 1) insiders. 
= | ∈ … ∈A A A f f f k K{ { (1), (2), , ( )}, }K k k i dd i i1 1  with d classical shares = = | ∈s s f i k K{ ( ) }K k i d1d i1 1 , where i1 
is the public information of Aki1, AKd can conspire to compute
Figure 4. When m = 2, the outcome probabilities for superposition states where P denotes the probability. 
(a) When the entangled photons goes to the Fi sorter in Bi’s laboratory without being eavesdropped, Bi can 
measure the superposition state correctly, or either of the other two superpositions states. (b) When Eve chooses 
the Ei sorter, she can detect two possible eigenstates with the probability of 12  respectively, which can result in two different superpositions with the probability of 1
4
 besides the original superposition state.
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∑ ∏=
−
−∈ ∈ ≠
f x A
x x
x x
( )
(4)k K
k
k K k k
k
k k,i d
i
j d j i
j
i j1
1
1 1
Next, we only need to consider the case of d = m, i.e., the upper bound of |P s s( )Kd , the probability of the secret 
with the knowledge of sKd. If the s
i′ obtained by the recovered Lagrange polynomial is less than p, then we can have 
≠′s si i1 1, so, | =
−
P s s( )K p
1
1d
 because the recovered value ′si1 can be removed from the secret space =S p. Note 
that a0 is chosen at random in Fp and thus =P s( ) p
1 . So, we have
∆ = − |
≤ − −
=
−
→ + ∞
<
s s H s H s s
p p
p
p
p
( ; ) ( ) ( )
log log( 1)
log
1
(5)
K Kd d

That is to say, when p → + ∞ , ∆ →s s( ; ) 0Kd . Hence, for any k < m + 1 classical participants, our proposed hybrid 
′ + t m m(( , ), ( 1, )) threshold QSS is asymptotically perfect with respect to the set of probability distributions 
P(⋅) on the secret space S. □ 
Theorem 2 (Outsider attacks). Given the hybrid ′ + t m m(( , ), ( 1, )) threshold QSS, and the set of the quantum 
participants’ shares is Q with |Q| = m, and an outsider has already known any subset <Q k m{ , }k
i  of Qm
i , then 
scheme is asymptotically perfect with respect to the set of probability distributions P(⋅ ) on the secret space S. That 
is, for any > 0 , there exists an integer p0 such that for any p > p0 with =S p, we have
∆ = − ≤s Q H s H s Q( ; ) ( ) ( ) (6)k k 
where H(s) is the entropy of s, the conditional entropy H(s|Qk) denotes the entropy of s conditioned on Qk, and 
Δ (s; Qk) denotes the entropy loss of s generated by the knowledge of Qk.
Proof. First, there are m + 1 (m > t′ ) classical participants {C1, C2, ···, Cm+1} and t′ quantum participants 
{B1, B2, ···, Bt′}. Suppose that an outsider has already known Qk
i quantum shares and recovered the value 
= + + +−
′
−
′
−
′′
s F F Fi n
m
n
m
n m
m
1 2
1 . Let us examine the probability of =′s si i1 1, and p s Q( )i k
i1  is the probability of the 
sub-secret si1 with the knowledge of Qk
i1. =′s si i1 1 means + + + = + + +−
′
−
′
−
′
− − − F F F F F Fn
m
n
m
n m
m
n
m
n
m
n m
m
1 2 1 2 .
On the one hand, for the party who detects a particular m-bonacci number, there is still an m-fold uncertainty 
about the m-bonacci number other parties detect in ref. 32. For example, when = +− −F F Fi
m
i
m
i
m
1 2, if the outsider 
detects the value −Fi
m
1, the other party’s value can be Fi
m or −Fi
m
2. Moreover, due to the quantum no-cloning 
theorem13, outsiders will be detected when eavesdropping over the quantum channels (see Figs 3 and 4). 
Therefore, ∑ − ∑ ≥= =′
′m c F c F m{ ( ), 2}im i i
m
i
m
i i
m
1 1  are uniformly distributed. To some degree, this suggests the 
sub-secret ′si1 and si1, even s′ and s are actually independent of each other.
On the other hand, the quantum participants’ shares are independent of the classical participants’ shares. 
Moreover, the quantum participants’ shares are used for eavesdropping detection rather than key generation. 
Consequently, outsiders cannot use their quantum shares directly as they do in Cleve et al.’s QSS14 to obtain the 
secret. Therefore, outsiders cannot have a better way to get the secret except to assume s′ = s.
Second, as we know, the classical shares are allocated in Shamir’s SS1, which are uniformly distributed over  p. 
Given that = + + +− − −s F F F
i
n
m
n
m
n m
m
1 2
1 , and =p s( )
p
1 . The probability for outsiders to successfully obtain the 
values without being detected is 



+ −( )p1pF 1nm , where  pFnm  means that the largest integer is less than or equal to p
Fn
m . Hence, the entropy loss of the secret satisfies

∆ = −
≤ −




+
=
× 



+
<
+
=
+
→ + ∞
<
( )
s Q H s H s Q
F p
F
p
p F
p
p
( ; ) ( ) ( )
log log
1
log
1
log
log
1
(7)
k k
n
m
p
F
n
m p
F
n
m
F
p
F
p
n
m
n
m
n
m
n
m
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That is to say, when p → + ∞ , Δ (s; Qk) → 0. Hence, our proposed hybrid ′ + t m m(( , ), ( 1, )) threshold QSS is 
asymptotically perfect with respect to the secret space S. Here, Flog n
m is the abbreviation of Flog n
m
2 . □ 
Resistance against cloning and impersonation attacks. Our scheme is based on the fact that the 
nonorthogonal states are indistinguishable, so it is immune against cloning and impersonation attacks. Even if 
Eve successfully detects the value of an m-bonacci-value-entangled photon, according to the quantum no-cloning 
theorem, she is unable to clone any other undetected m-bonacci-value-entangled photon.
Let us consider impersonation attacks. A possible strategy Eve can use is to capture the original 
m-bonacci-value-entangled photon and send a fake m-bonacci-value-entangled photon, say −Fn
m
1 , to other quan-
tum participants. To be exact, after Dealer sends the state, Eve simply captures the original state and stores it. She 
then sends one m-bonacci-value-entangled photon from the fake state − −F Fn
m
n m
m
1  to other quantum partici-
pant Bi. However, due to the particular encoding used in our scheme, the m-bonacci-value-entangled photon 
varies and the impersonation attack is easy to be detected. For example, if she detects that the value of entangled 
photon is 2 from −Fn 1
5 , she sends one 3-bonacci-value-entangled photon as the fake state. Obviously, the imper-
sonation attack does not succeed.
Resistance against replay attacks. Our scheme is immune against replay attacks. A replay attack is such 
an attack that a valid data transmission is maliciously or fraudulently repeated or delayed. Because we use adapt-
able m-bonacci sequences for preparing m-bonacci-sequence entangled states, the quantum and classical shares 
change accordingly. Moreover, due to the use of varying m-bonacci numbers to prepare entangled states, Eve can-
not know which m-bonacci sequence is really used every time. For example, suppose that for the fourth subkey, 
3-bonacci sequences are used, however, 6-bonacci sequences are used for the fifth subkey. As a result, it is impos-
sible to launch an impersonation attack by inserting the used m-bonacci sequences for the subkey. Therefore, our 
scheme is immune to replay attacks.
Resistance against man-in-the-middle attacks. A man-in-the-middle attack is an attack, in which Eve 
intercepts the transmitted entangled photons and replays other entangled photons. We now show that our scheme 
provides resistance against the man-in-the-middle attacks. First, quantum channels are authenticated; second, for 
the party who detects a particular m-bonacci number, there is still a m-fold uncertainty about the m-bonacci 
number other parties detect. Suppose that the eavesdropper Eve, is in possession of an entangled state analyzer for 
the m-bonacci-value entangled states. If so, she will be able to distinguish −Fn
m
1 , −Fn
m
2 , ···, or −Fn m
m  when Dealer 
sends one of them. However, in the detected sorter, she has a random outcome. Suppose the eavesdropping strat-
egy is to resend the m-bonacci-value entangled state according to the result of her m-bonacci-value entangled 
state analysis. In order to detect the eavesdropper, we should consider what happens if, for instance, the state 
−Fn
m
1  is sent by Dealer. In one −
1
2m 1
th of the cases Eve chooses the right sorter, and resends the m-bonacci-value 
entangled state perfectly. In the remaining − −1
1
2m 1
 of the cases Eve chooses the wrong sorter and sends the 
superposition state + + +− − F F Fn
m
n
m
n
m
2 3 . These states will be correctly detected by B1, B2, ··· Bm together 
with any m + 1 classical participants. By adding all the probability of causing an error becomes 
× + × =−
×− −
−
− −( )m m m12 12 1 2 12 1 12m m m m m1 1 1 1 1 , which is the same as two-state cryptography. In a manner similar 
to the two-state cryptography, it is also possible to launch a more complex eavesdropping attack using an ancilla, 
or measuring in an intermediate basis compared to the {0, 1} bases. However, the eavesdropper is still detectable, 
and the fundamental security remains. Hence, our scheme provides resistance against the man-in-the-middle 
attacks.
Discussion
Simon et al.31 used positive and negative OAM pumps to improve information capacity which can only be dou-
bled, and their scheme needs a joint quantum operation. Moreover, with 2-bonacci values used alone, to multiple 
the information capacity, larger 2-bonacci values should be used, and the available bandwidth becomes more of a 
challenge. Also, they argued that though lower error rates can be achieved by the use of higher-2-bonacci values 
(Fibonacci numbers), the transmission distances are shorter. While the longer distances can be achieved by the 
use of lower-2-bonacci values, the error rates are higher. When only 2-bonacci values are used, it is hard to satisfy 
the requirements of lower error rates and longer transmission distances. Based on these mentioned problems, we 
incorporate m-bonacci sequences into both quantum and classical coding, with reverse Huffman-Fibonacci-tree 
coding, to achieve higher-capacity and lower-bandwidth hybrid threshold adaptable QSS scheme.
The information capacity. Given the above conclusion, proper m-bonacci values can be chosen to achieve 
the lower error rates and longer distances. Hence, we propose to use Huffman coding tree to encode m-bonacci 
numbers with the greedy algorithm, which can greatly improve the coding capacity, thus reducing the use of 
entangled photons. To be exact, for fixed m-bonacci number sets, we use binary representations of m-bonacci 
numbers based on Fibonacci numbers of order m ≥ 2 (see Equation (11)). Hence, this paper extends Simon et al.’s 
quantum key distribution protocol presenting a novel feature, where Fibonacci numbers 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 31, 34 are 
used. According to the method of reverse Huffman-Fibonacci-tree coding in Eqs (11) and (12) of the following 
section, each m-bonacci number can then represent a binary string as follows:
= ⋅ || ⋅ || ⋅ || ⋅ || ⋅
⋅ || ⋅ || ⋅
c c c c c c
c c c
0 (10) (110) (1110) (11110)
(111110) (1111110) (1111111) (8)
1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
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where ∈ ∈ …⁎⁎c i{0, 1}, {1, 2, , 8}i , and ⋅
−
  ⁎
⁎
c (11 10)i
i 1
 denotes when i* = 1, the corresponding codes are 
−
  
⁎
11 10
i 1
; when i* = 0, there are no corresponding codes.
Therefore, the information capacity of each m-bonacci number is
∑= +
=
I ic c7
(9)c i
i
1
7
8
Take 4 = 3 + 1, 7 = 5 + 2, 15 = 13 + 2, 16 = 13 + 3, 24 = 21 + 3, 29 = 21 + 8, 31 = 21 + 8 + 2, 32 = 21 + 8 + 3 for exam-
ple (as shown in Table 1, according to Equations (11) and (12), their binary Fibonacci representations would be as follows:
= + = +
= + = +
= + = +
= + + = + + .
4 3 1:1111101111111, 7 5 2:111101111110,
15 13 2:1101111110, 16 13 3:110111110,
24 21 3:10111110, 29 21 8:101110,
31 21 8 2:1011101111110, 32 21 8 3:101110111110 (10)
It can be seen from Equation (10), compared with the high-capacity coding in terms with Simon et al.’s protocol, 
in which they double the information capacity per photon, we multiply the information capacity. In the above 
example, the average bits per photon is 10.375. If the size of the key is 360,000, we need to prepare about 36,000 
rather than 90,000 entangled states, making our scheme more practical. This is because it is difficult and costly to 
prepare entangled states.
Besides the information capacity, Table 2 compares the features of our proposed scheme with those of the 
secret sharing schemes in refs 1, 14, 24 and 26. The comparison suggests that our secret sharing scheme is more 
suitable for real-world applications. Distinct from the well-known Shamir’s classical secret sharing scheme1 
against secret leakage, our proposed scheme can both detect eavesdropping and protect the secret from leaking. 
Meanwhile, compared with QSS schemes14,24,26, our scheme can achieve the adaptability and flexibility based on 
the following two facts: 1) the various m-bonacci values are used to adapt to participant mobility; 2) the 
m-bonacci values are encoded in Lagrange polynominal, and as a result, any t′ quantum participants and any 
m + 1 classical participants can recover the secret. Due to the no-cloning theorem and its impact on parameters, 
for QSS schemes14,24,26,31, the parameters  and t′ must satisfy the requirement of < ′ − t2 1, and once t′ quan-
tum participants are fixed, other quantum participants are unable to participate in the recovery of the secret. 
However, in our scheme, the parameters  and t′ can be arbitrary, and our scheme is robust when a new partici-
pant joins or an existing participant leaves.
Unlike eavesdropping detection in QSS schemes14,24,26, due to entangled states prepared by m-bonacci 
sequences, the detection is possible by any subset that contains at least 



m
2
 participants. That is to say, none of the 
number of threshold value quantum participants are required to reach a consensus in order to reveal eavesdrop-
ping. Because the method of the Huffman-Fibonacci coding is employed in our scheme, the classical bits denoted 
by every m-bonacci number are significantly improved, from four bits at most to more than ten bits using a sim-
ilar experimental setup. Consequently, our scheme can greatly improve the coding capacity, thus reducing the use 
of entangled photons which are expensive and difficult to prepare. Moreover, to generate the secret, the m-bonacci 
sequences encoded in Lagrange interpolation polynomials and the Huffman-Fibonacci coding are applied. So, 
compared with the CSS in ref. 1 where the size of secret shares is the same as that of the secret itself, our scheme 
allows the former to be of much smaller than the secret itself. To be exact, the smaller m-bonacci sequences such 
as m = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 can be used in our proposed scheme, the pump values in Fig. 1 is smaller and the size of classical 
shares is much smaller since the size of the prime is much smaller than that used in ref. 1. In addition, we generate 
secret shares for blocks generation, thus significantly reducing the bandwidth compared with ref. 1.
For the communication overhead, there are m quantum and  classical participants. Let P and p (P ≫ p) be 
primes, then the communication overhead in ref. 1 is n|P| bits, where |P| and |p| denote the bit number of P and 
p. It can be known that the size of the key is |P|, so, |P| photons are prepared. In ref. 14, only quantum channel is 
used, so, the communication overhead is n|P| qubits. The ref. 24 proposes a hybrid quantum secret sharing, in 
Schemes Ref. 1 Ref. 14 Ref. 24 Ref. 26 Our scheme
Adaptable threshold No No No No Yes
Flexible threshold Yes No No No Yes
Robustness High Low Low Low High
Detect eavesdropping No Yes Yes Yes Yes
The information capacity 1bit 1bit 1bit ∑ += ic c( 7 )i i1
7
8  bits
Classical communication overhead
 P  bits 0bit − −

m(2 1) P  bits 0bit 

p P
10  bits
Quantum communication overhead 0
 P  qubits − +

m(2 2 1) P  qubits  P  qubits

m P
10  qubits
Hybrid quantum secret sharing No No Yes Yes Yes
Table 2.  Performance comparison of HQSS with previous QSSs. m is the threshold value, and  denotes  
classical or quantum participants, P and p (P ≫ p) are primes which are used in ref. 1 and our scheme, and |P| 
and |p| denote the bit number of P and p.
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which both quantum and classical channel are used. There are − + m(2 2 1) quantum participants and 
− −m(2 1) classical participants. Therefore, the quantum communication overhead for the scheme in ref. 26 is 
− + | m P
n
(2 2 1)  qubits, and the classical communication overhead is − − |

m P(2 1)  bits. In our scheme, the quantum 
communication overhead is at most 

m P
10
 qubits, and the classical communication overhead is 

p P
10
 bits.
In conclusion, we combine the Huffman-Fibonacci quantum coding with Lagrange polynomials to achieve 
threshold adaptable QSS. The key point of our scheme is that it does not suffer from the restriction derived from 
the quantum no-cloning theorem, because it permits secret sharing for arbitrary values of parameters  and m + 1 
provided that ≥ + m 1. We use the Huffman coding tree to encode the obtained m-bonacci numbers, aiming 
at improving the coding capacity greatly, and thus incurring a low communication overhead. When compared to 
the existing QSS schemes, there is an improvement in sharing the secret without joint quantum operations. 
Meanwhile, our scheme still works when there are dynamic changes in comparison with existing quantum secret 
sharing, such as the unavailability of some quantum channel, the arrival of new participants and the departure of 
participants.
Methods
Huffman-Fibonacci coding. Fraenkel and Klein29 showed that any integer including an m-bonacci number 
can be represented by a binary string of length r, cr, cr−1, … , c2, c1 such that
∑= .
=
−F c F (11)n
m
i
r
i r i
1
2
When one uses the following procedure to produce it, the Equation (11) will be unique. Given the integer Fn
m, find 
the largest Fibonacci number Fr
2 smaller or equal to Fn
m; then continue recursively with ~F Fn
m
r
2. Therefore, for 
coding, we explore the properties of Fibonacci representations for variable-length encoding, especially the trade-off 
between their robustness and their scalability efficiency. To be exact, we use the Huffman coding in ref. 36 and the 
greedy algorithm in ref. 37 to improve the coding capacity of the detected m-bonacci values.
m + 1 classical participants encode the reconstructed m-bonacci value based on the fact that the higher the 
frequency at which Fibonacci numbers appear in m-bonacci values, the longer the set of binary codes, which is 
opposite to the idea of Huffman coding. Let the binary codes of − F F F, , ,r r
2
1
2
1
2 be − C C C, , ,r r
2
1
2
1
2 respec-
tively. So, the binary codes of Fn
m are represented by the concatenation of − C C Cr r
2
1
2
1
2. For example, if the 
frequencies from 1 to 34 which appear in m-bonacci values decrease, the coding is as follows (see Fig. 5);
= = = =
= = = = .
F F F F
F F F F
1:1111111, 2:1111110, 3:111110, 5:11110,
8:1110, 13:110, 21:10, 34:0 (12)
1
2
2
2
3
2
4
2
5
2
6
2
7
2
8
2
So, the available reconstructed −Fn m
m  is used in terms of Eqs (9) and (12), and a sub-key can be obtained. The key 
can be obtained by concatenating all the sub-keys generated in the same way.
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
= = = =
= = = =
−
=
− −
=
− −
=
− −
=
−
−
=
− −
=
− −
=
− −
=
−
⁎
⁎ ⁎
⁎
⁎ ⁎
⁎
⁎ ⁎
⁎
⁎ ⁎
⁎
⁎ ⁎
⁎
⁎ ⁎
⁎
⁎ ⁎
⁎
⁎ ⁎
F c F F c F F c F F c F
F c F F c F F c F F c F
, , , ,
, , , ,
(13)
n
m
i
r
i r i n
m
i
r
i r i n
m
i
r
i r i n
m
i
r
i r i
n
m
i
r
i r i n
m
i
r
i r i n
m
i
r
i r i n
m
i
r
i r i
8
1
1 2
7
1
2 2
6
1
3 2
5
1
4 2
4
1
5 2
3
1
6 2
2
1
7 2
1
1
8 2
where … ∈⁎ ⁎ ⁎ ⁎c c c c, , , , {0, 1}i i i i
1 2 7 8 .
Figure 5. The Huffman-Fibonacci coding tree for the eight Fibonacci numbers (as symbol frequencies) 
from 1 to 34. 
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For example, if the final detected values of available entangled states are = = + +F 44 34 8 27
3 , 
= = +F 29 21 86
4 , ···, their corresponding coding is 011101111110, 101110, ··· in terms of Eq. (12). The key can 
be established with   011101111110 101110  concatenated for secret sharing. In other words, any m + 1 classi-
cal participants can share the secret encrypted by the key using the one-time-pad encryption.
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